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ABSTRACT
The performance of a political party mainly depends on 
its party organization, ideology and electoral support. In 
this connection, party discipline can be counted as an 
independent variable of party performance. However, party 
discipline may be affected by various factors, such as party
structure, political culture, governmental structure.
This study examines the anti-disciplinary behaviors and 
attitudes in the SDPP in 1988-1992 period by giving emphasis 
to the party structure.
In the light of the content analysis of the party 
discipline cases in the SDPP as appeared in Turkish daily 
press between 1988-1992, we can classify main sources of
violations of party discipline as follows:
(a) The leadership struggle;
(b) The ideological/factional differentiations;
(c) The Kurdish problem.
ÖZET
Bir siyasal partinin basarisi esas olarak partinin 
orgut yapisi, ideolojisi ve seçmen desteği ile ilgilidir. Bu 
bağlamda, parti disiplini parti basarisini ölçmede bagimsiz 
bir değişken olarak kabul edilebilir. Bununla birlikte parti 
disiplini parti yapisi, siyasal kültür, hükümet yapisi gibi 
birçok faktör tarafindan etkilenebilir.
Bu calisma 1988-1992 döneminde SHP'de disiplin dişi 
davranis ve tavirlari parti yapisini esas alarak
incelemektedir.
1988-1992 döneminde basina yansiyan disiplin dişi 
davranislara ilişkin olaylarin muhteva analizi isiginda, 
SHP'deki disiplin ihlallerinin baslica sebeplerini su şekilde 
sıralayabiliriz:
(a) Liderlik mücadelesi;
(b) Ideoloji/hizip farklilasmalari; ve
(c) Kurt sorunu.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
Political parties, as indispensible elements of a
democratic political system, perform several important
functions that help the political system survive. These
include linkage with other institutions, aggregation of
1interest, political socialization and so on.
The importance of political parties becomes clearer in
developing countries. In the absence of other associations/
institutions, political parties play a critical role in the
modernization process of these countries. Thus,political
parties and their performance have become a popular area of
interest for social scientists.
The performance of a political party mainly depends on
its party organization, ideology and electoral support.
In this connection, party discipline can be counted as
an independent variable of party performance. The concept of
party discipline, many times, has been confused with the
2
terms party cohesion and party unity. According to Ranney
and Kendall, party cohesion (or party unity) can be
described as " the extent to which, in a given situation,
group members can be observed to work together for the
3
group's goals in one and the same way"
On the other hand, the concept of party discipline may 
denote two meanings: (a) the cohesion which is structured and
maintained by the obedience of group members to leader and to 
his decisions, and (b) the existence of some forceful
mechanisms and methods in the hands of the leader in order to
provide the obedience of the group members vis-a-vis his 
4
decisions.
In other words, party discipline can be regarded as a
special type of cohesion. But party cohesion, in general, may
be achieved by many other mechanisms, in the absence of
discipline, such as by ideological unity, intra-party
5
solidarity and consensus. Therefore, the aim of party
discipline is to achieve the intra-party cohesion. But the
existence of party cohesion in a party does not necessarily
require the existence of party discipline. In the absence of
cohesion within a party, we can not mention aboutthe
existence of party discipline. Contrary to this, in the
absence of party discipline we may still speak of party 
6
cohesion.
Given the fact that the discipline and the solidarity 
are the two main sources of party cohesion, we must 
evaluate them from different perspectives.
Obviously, definition of party discipline by Ranney 
and Kendall stresses the concept of leadership and the 
obedience to the leader. Those who may not satisfied with 
this definition may raise the following argument: In most
parties, the party discipline is identified with the 
obedience to the group decisions or to the strictly defined 
party rules and regulations, but not to the leader himself. 
However,since the group decisions and the party rules and 
regulations are applied by the leader or by the leadership 
cadre, in the last analysis the obedience to the group
decisions and the party rules can be understood as obeying7
the leadership position. Therefore in this study the concept 
of party discipline, in general, refers to the obedience to 
the decisions of the leadership cadre within a party 
organization.
On the other hand, in terms of the intra-party
democracy, one can claim that, the existence of the strong
disciplinary arrangements do not necessarily lead to the
absence of intra-party democracy within a political party.
Moreover, the presence of the intra-party democracy does not
create a contradiction with party discipline. Furthermore,
8
both of them can be present within a party coincidentally.
Besides, it can be argued that intra-party democracy
strengthens the party discipline in some respects. According
to this argumentation, for example, the election of the
leader in a democratic way makes his authority legitimate in
the eyes of the party members. And this helps the
9establishment of the party discipline.
According to the party discipline variable, we can
classify the political parties into two categories: (a)
highly disciplined; and, (b) not so highly disciplined
10
political parties. If a political party creates a strictly 
defined controlling mechanisms over some actions of its 
members, either through the domination of the leader or the 
supression of certain commissions and the whips of the party 
within the limits of commonly legitimized and clearly defined 
disciplinary regulations, it can be identified within the
former category. Whereas if a party leaves their members free
of their actions, it can be defined within the latter. As it
was noted by Ozbudun, European socialist parties can be given
as an example to the former category while the American
11political parties are the best examples of the latter.
But of course, such a general classification is not 
sufficient to understand why there are so much different 
perceptions and practices of discipline within various 
parties of the democratic world. In order to explain this 
phenomenon, it will be better to search for the different 
formations and their impacts on party discipline.
1. STRUCTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE PARTY DISCIPLINE
Various factors which surround a political party may 
influence the degree of party discipline. According to 
Ozbudun those factors can be classified into four main 
headings:
(1) Party Structure;
(2) Governmental Structure;
(3) Social Structure;
12
(4) Political Culture.
(1) PARTY STRUCTURE: Party structure is one of the most
important factors of party discipline and was generally
13
advanced by Maurice Duverger. According to this argument,
the party structure and its effects on the party discipline
can be identified by analysing two main aspects of party
structure; first, the power of the party organization, and14
second the typology of the party organizations. We will
discuss those aspects of party structure and their impact on
party discipline below (p.6)
(2) GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE: Governmental structure
affects the party discipline by its various dimensions.
Firstly, election systems are essential for party discipline.
Since the proportional representation and party list methods
make the party members (or candidates) depend on the party
administration, they lead to strong party discipline. However
the single name method causes a weak disciplinary structure,
because in this method the party candidates are more
15autonomous from party organizations.
Moreover, the system of government, federal or unitary,
may also influence the degree of party discipline. In federal
system weak party discipline is expectable because of the
creation of local interest groups conflicting with each other
both within the parliament and within mass parties. However,
this does not mean that the unitary systems always favour
strong party discipline, and federal system inevitably causes16
weak party discipline.
Furthermore, political system is also essential for 
party discipline. In parliamentary system, vote of 
confidence is a necessary condition for coming to and 
preserving power. Therefore, each party should have a strong 
party discipline in order to come to power. However, in a 
presidential system the election of the president does not 
depend on the parliament, the deputies are freer in their 
actions. This leads to less party discipline within both the
parliament and the parties in the system.
(3) SOCIAL STRUCTURE: The most important aspect of
social structure, which is effective on the party discipline,
is the stratification of the social classes and the existence
of the parties of working class. And it is the reality that,
in the parties of working class there is a strong party
18
discipline throughout the world.
The existence of the stratification among the social
classes may cause an extreme party system in which political
parties may have strong party discipline. However, if there
is a less stratified party system, there may be a tendency
towards the weaker discipline in political parties.
(4) POLITICAL CULTURE: According to Dowse and Hughes,
"political culture is the product of the history of both
political system and the individual members of the system,
and, thus, is rooted in public events and private
13
experience." Whereas Ozbudun states that political culture
is a component of the general culture, and it is conserned
with those parts of the general culture such as state
administration and the goals of the state. On the other hand
the main components of political culture are values,
believes and the emotional tendencies within the general 
20
culture.
17
a. PARTY STRUCTURE AND PARTY DISCIPLINE 
Party structure is the only internal factor affecting 
the party discipline. In this regard, power of party 
organization and the type of party can be counted as the main
determining factors.
(a) The Power of the Party Organization: According to
Duverger's 'organization pressure theory', the powerful party
organizations (which are the party organizations out of
parliament, that is "caucus”, local party organizations)
create a controlling mechanism on the deputies and therefore
21
cause a high party discipline. But according to Ozbudun,as
it was proved by many examples, powerful local party
organizations may not necessarily cause a high discipline. It
may even be just the opposite. Referring Ranney's argument,
Ozbudun states that, deputies' loyalty to a local-level party
organization, does not necessarily strengthen his or her
loyalty to the national-level party leadership. On the
contrary, sometimes this local-level party loyalty may
necessitate a disloyalty at the national level. As a matter
of fact, in some countries party leaders have suffered from
the pressures of the local party organizations over the
deputies, as a source of intra-party disunity, for example in
the Australian Labour Party. But in European context there
are many examples which prove that in the absence of 'caucus'
pressures a party can establish a strong party discipline.
For example, British Labour and Conservative Parties, French
MRP, Italian Christian Democrat Party, German Social
Democratic Party can be given as the best examples of this 
22
phenomenon.
(b) The Typology of Party Organizations: According to 
Duverger's classification, party discipline in totalitarian
parties is very strong; in the parties of social and 
democratic integration it is strong; and in the parties of 
individual representation it is weak. But again Ozbudun 
argues that those generalizations can not contain all of the 
circumstances. For example, in Britain, in Commonwealth 
countries, and in Scandinavia, although political parties 
are the typical individual representation parties, they have 
a very strong party discipline. Consequently, it is obvious 
that, the presence of an integrative organization and
ideology within a party strenghtens the party discipline, but23
this is neither an absolute nor the only condition of it.
b. TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM AND THE PARTY DISCIPLINE
Multi-party period in Turkish politics began in 1946,
and developed in the 1950s. In the 1960s there was the two-
party system where the RPP and the JP were the two major 
24
parties. It is argued that, although their organizational
characteristics had a tendency to create a weak
disciplinary formation, because of their organization as a
cadre party, Turkish political parties fall into the category25
of disciplined parties for the period between 1946-1970.
According to Ozbudun, the reason for this situation is 
the existence in the Turkish context, of, (1) a parliamentary 
regime (although it is sometimes partially) dominated by 
a two-party system; (2) competition among the parties; and, 
(3) some features of Turkish political culture. As we have 
noted above in the parliamentary regime the strong party 
discipline is very important. Because, if you lose the
discipline in your party during the roll-calls in a
parliament, you will lose your power there too. The same
situation is valid in the Turkish case. Under the domination
of two major parties for many years, the Turkish
parliamentary regime led to a strong party discipline.
Moreover, the existence of an intense competition among
the parties has been another aspect of the Turkish context.
Despite the weakness of the ideological polarization, there
has been a very strong inter-party competition. In such
circumstance, obedience to the party decisions becomes very
important and discipline violations are not tolerated.
Finally some features of Turkish political culture such
as, the Islamic tradition of obedience to the legitimate
authority , which is inherited from the pre-republican
period, became another reason of strong party discipline in
26
Turkish political parties.
In the 1970s a multi-party system was the key feature
of Turkish politics. In this period although many other
small parties were established by the 1973 elections, still
the RPP and the JP dominated the system. However, the
existence of the small parties caused the fractionalization
of the electorate, since each party tried to maximize the
27
ideological distance between itself and others.
During this period, three important destabilising
factors affected the Turkish party system. They were the
28
volatility; fragmentation; and polarization.
This structural features affected all party
organizations. Fractionalization and polarization processes
took place even within the political parties. For example,
the RPP, after the leadership of Ecevit, began to move to the
center-left side of the political spectrum. This
transformation process was not achieved without intra-party
strife. Considerable number of deputies left the RPP in order
to establish a new party, by critisizing the RPP moving "too29
far to the left". This was the first appeareance of the
factional divisions within Turkish social democracy.
Another important feature of the Turkish party system,
which led to the formation of factions within the political
parties , was the tendency of the leaders to stay in their
position regardless of his political performance. This caused
the challenge to the leadership position by variuos party
members creating a source for the existence of various intra-30party factions.
Following the third military intervention of September
12, 1980 the Turkish party system changed to a greater
extent. Although the party system structure of the 1970s
greatly influenced the party system in the 1980s, the parties
that were opened in this period were organized under the
31
control and great pressure of the military regime. Since 
the NSC used its veto power against unwanted persons in the 
establishment process of the political parties, Social 
Democratic Party (SODEP) under the leadership of Erdal Inonu, 
was one of the principal victims of this procedure. It could 
not participate in the 1983 national elections with many 
other new parties as a result of these vetoes.This situation
10
also affected the organizational structure of the political
parties. Loose party organizations, affecting the issues of
party cohesion and party discipline, were the common
characteristics of the Turkish party system in this period
under the absence of strong leadership and organizational 
32
authority.
But there were some exceptional cases within this
context. For example. The Motherland Party appeared as a
cohesive party organization, because the MP was an "important
beneficiary from the demise of the military-sponsored
33
parties, so that Ozal did not enforce the law." This helped
the organizational process of the MP, under the strong 
leadership of Ozal.
But the SDPP, as a successor of the RPP, which was a
political party of the pre-1980 period, had to leave its RPP
originned founders and members in order to stay as a party
organization. This was another dimension of the fragmentation
in Turkish social democracy. Since it tried to cover all
parts of the Turkish left, from the extreme leftist groups to
the Kurdish origin cliques, new cliques and factions
became inevitable for the SDPP.
Since the political context that has presented a
fertile ground for the emergence of the SDPP was really a
product of special conditions structured by the 1980
34
military coup, it can be claimed that the SDPP is a sui- 
generis political party which does not reflect the same 
structural features with that of the RPP and with the other 
parties of Turkish political tradition, especially in terms
11
of its intra-party unity.
2. PARTY DISCIPLINE AND THE SDPP
The SDPP appeared on the Turkish political scene
through the merger in 1985 of two political parties; The
Social Democratic Party (SODEP) and the Populist Party (PP).
The first SDPP congress was held at the end of May 1986 and
35Erdal Inonu was elected as party leader.
Although the merger created a positive impact on the 
public as a serious threat to the ruling Motherland Party, 
the turmoil which was a characteristic of the PP continued to 
erode the parliamentary strength of the SDPP. Even on 
controversial issues, the SDPP deputies failed to block or 
even stall the Motherland Party.
Splits in the SDPP continued and the Democratic Left 
Party (DLP) was able to establish a parliamentary group with 
deputies who resigned from the SDPP. This caused the split in 
the votes of the center-left in the 1987 general elections.
In addition to its struggle with the DLP, the party had 
its own internal problems. Its new deputies, elected in 
primaries, had different approaches to Turkey's problem and 
how to go about implementing social democratic principles.
Although the inner turmoil in the SDPP led Inonu to 
resign from his office as well as from the parliament on 
February 28, 1988, he was convinced that he should stay.
The final event that had brought about Inonu's 
resignation was the dispute on the Kurdish issue within the 
party. Mehmet Ali Eren, Istanbul deputy, in an off the
12
agenda parliamentary address on February 25, 1988 said that 
the law of the land was applied differently in the west and 
in the east of Turkey and that the exitence of Turks of 
Kurdish origin had always been rejected. In other words, the 
SDPP has consistently presented the image of a party driven 
by factions.
It is argued that those intra-party oppositions,
conflicts and divisions help the creation of a negative
image of the party as being a problematic organization. And,
therefore those problems are probably the fundamental reasons
for the loss of the party's credit and supportance in the
eyes of the Turkish voters, which was the case in the last36
general elections of 1991.
Through this feature of the party, it is interesting to
design a reseach project on the topic of'party discipline' in
the SDPP. What are the reasons for the anti-disciplinary
behavior in the SDPP ? Is it caused by weak leadership
structure?, or is it related with the intra-party struggle to
come to power among the intra-party factions? Whether or
not the organizational misformations cause this situation?
Is it really related with the existence of "extensive" intra-
37party democracy in the SDPP? Or, is the definition of 
the concept of party discipline different in the SDPP than 
the traditionally leader-dominated political parties of 
Turkish politics? And can it be the combination of all those 
factors which cause the problem of discipline in the SDPP?.
As we have mentioned above, the SDPP is a successor of
13
the RPP in terms of its political tradition, and the SDPP is
being governed by nearly the same regulations like the 
38
RPP. Moreover, some parts of the factional divisions within 
the SDPP are inherited from the RPP structure. But the party 
discipline and the intra-party democracy issues were not so 
much problematic in the RPP as it is the case now in the 
SDPP, at least in terms of their negative effects on the 
image of the party.
In order to make this argument clear, firstly we must
look at the RPP case. As Bektas noted, although the RPP tried
to provide a democratic outlook in the last decades of
its life, both the effects of the single-party period and
strong leader authority made it difficult to develop intra-
39
party democracy within the party. She also claims that, ?
"after 1970, the party's inner structure was modified by
taking the Western mass parties as model. So, the only
effective body in determining party politics and making day-
to-day decisions turned out to be the central executive
office. RPP realised intra-party democracy only from time to
time. Intra-party democracy has not become an enduring
40characteristics of the RPP."
On the other hand , in terms of party discipline, 
although there were some marginal violations of discipline in 
various times, this strong leadership authority and the 
effects of the single-party period traditions created a 
disciplinary structure within the party.
Therefore when we compare it with the present SDPP, even
14
though the party discipline would be stronger in the RPP in
comparison to its successor, the SDPP has inherited at least
the factional structure in the absence of strong leadership.
It is just an output of a trend which took place in the
41
transformation process of Turkish social democracy.
According to our initial observation from the written
sources, the structural variables such as leadership; party
ideology and programme; and policy issues and ethnical groups
are seen to be the main factors of discipline violations
within the SDPP. Because when we search for the establishment
period of the SDPP from the media,the structural variables,
especially party ideology and the structure of party
organization were very influential, despite the vetoes,on the
determination of leader. Therefore it will be more
explanatory to examine the impact of the leadership struggle
on the party discipline within the party's structural
context. In other words, what kinds of features of the
structure of party organization influence the party
discipline? Are they the norms, that are present within the
party programme and party by-law , which are structured by
42
eclectic and contraversial world views, cause a loose
disciplinary structure in the party? Or, does the ideology of
43
the party causes this situation?
In order to give answer to those questions we should 
elaborate those 'structural variables' for the SDPP context.
(1) Content of the party programme (ideology) and by­
law: In the SDPP party programme and by-law there are a lot 
of contradictory arguments. At least, for example, in various
15
parts of party programme both pro-etatist arguments and the
views supporting the free market mechanisms are mentioned,
44simultaneously, as the ideology of the party. This
situation reflects the eclectic aspect of the SDPP 
ideology. Moreover, there is also a contradiction between the 
party ideology, which is presented in party programme and by­
law, and the party's daily practices. This contradictory and 
eclectic structure of the party ideology may contribute to 
the emergence of factions and therefore the weak party 
discipline in the SDPP. For example, in the party by-law,
concepts such as, 'freedom', 'pluralism',and 'participatory
45democracy' are announced as the aims of the SDPP.
In Turkish political culture, where the leader's 
domination and the obedience to the leader's decisions are 
the leading tradition in the structure of the Turkish 
political parties throughout the republican period, those 
kinds of themes may lead to anti-disciplinary behaviours in 
a political party.
Although intra-party democracy and party
discipline concepts are not contrary to each other, in 
Turkish political context those kinds of notions of intra­
party democracy such as, 'freedom', 'pluralism', and 
'participatory democracy', may be perceived as polyphony and 
as signs of the lack of intra-party unity. And then this may 
cause anti-disciplinary behaviours.
(2) Impact of the Factions and Cligues: To what extent 
the ideological structure of the party reflects itself in the
16
creation of factions within the party? And then, of course, 
what are the roles of those factions in the existence of 
intra-party disunity and then the party discipline problems?
As we mentioned earlier, the turmoil was the common 
characteristics of the social democratic parties. In this 
context, the SDPP presented the image of the party divided 
into factions. Following the lifting of the political bans on 
former politicians, Deniz Baykal and his colleagues from the 
RPP joined forces against the party's Populist Party flank. 
They began to advocate the need for the SDPP to become RPP, 
while a group of deputies, mainly from the eastern parts of 
Turkey as well as those with trade unionist background 
rejected this inclination. They formed a Kurdish clique 
within the party as being one of the most important factors 
of discipline violations. They said that the SDPP should 
strife to become a social democratic party in the most 
contemporary sense. And as a consequence of their radical 
attitudes they decided to leave the SDPP and form another 
party organization, namely, the People's Labor Party (PLP) in 
the 1991.
The other group is known as the "left wing" of the 
SDPP. They have been charged of allowing the "far left" and 
"separatist" views to infiltrate tha party. On these accounts 
we can classify the intra-party factions in the SDPP since 
its establishment as follows:
(a) Inonu Group (the majority of the Central Executive 
Committee);
(b) Baykal Group (the new-left group);
17
(c) People's Labour Party Group (PLP);
(d) Renewal Social Democrats;
(e) Some Other Marginals;
Each of these groups has its own whips, but in 
general, they are not very much successful in preventing the 
violations of discipline. The administrative power struggle 
of Baykal group and the separationist movements of the PLP 
group create special crucial discipline problems, within and 
outside the party.
46
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3. METHODOLOGY
As Ergun Ozbudun mentions there are various methods to
measure the party discipline. One of the most important
indicators of the party discipline,the party cohesion, can be
measured by (a) the concept of 'party vote', (b) the index of
47party cohesion, (c) the index of party loyalty.
According to Ozbudun, especially the third method; the
index of party loyalty, is also helpful in studying the party
discipline. Because we can use this method as a roll-call
analysis in order to describe the behaviour of an individual
representative on a large number of roll-calls.So, this index
may indicate the presence or the absence of party discipline48
within a party.
Moreover Ozbudun states that in order to measure
the "issue consensus" among the party members, the opinion
surveys are also useful. Besides, the concept of "n2gative
causation" can be used in order to measure the party 
49
cohesion.
In this study, our purpose is to describe the causes of 
the anti-disciplinary behaviours and attitudes in the SDPP.
In doing this, we intend to shed light on the
relationship between the ideological distinctions, which are 
motivated by the leadership and the power struggles, 
affecting some of the structural variables, such as, the 
establishment of the party organization, and contributing to 
the emergence of the factions and cliques within the party, 
and the party discipline in the SDPP.
In describing the causes of the anti-disciplinary
19
behavior and attitudes in the SDPP , we will rest our 
analysis on the following propositions:
(1) The more the number of ideological factions in a party 
the more violation of party discipline occurs.
(2) Issue dissersion may create divisions and eventually 
anti-disciplinary behaviour.
To test these propositions, we will use historically 
available data based on the Turkish daily newspapers namely 
Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, Gunes, Tercüman, Türkiye. We 
will try to analyze and classify the content of those written 
materials which refer to the anti-disciplinary behaviours and 
attitudes in the SDPP 1988 (after the 1987 general elections) 
and the spring 1992 (before the significant local elections).
Naturally using secondary data , such as news in mass 
media may mislead the researcher. Here we may face with the 
"subjectivity problem" which creates validity and reliability 
issues. To overcome these issues , we cross-checked the 
content of news from different newspapers.
20
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CHAPTER II
FINDINGS
1. CAUSES OF VIOLATION OF PARTY DISCIPLINE IN THE SDPP
The SDPP, as a product of the transition period
following the September 12, 1980 coup, has been living with
some organizational and/or structural problems, such as
leadership, factional divisions, and ideological unclarity.
Also, the SDPP became a less-disciplined parliamentary party,
in terms of the distribution of roll-calls in the Turkish
1Grand National Assembly, in recent Turkish politics. Anti- 
disciplinary tendencies were also observed in the behaviors 
and attitudes of the SDPP's members outside the parliament. 
In order to describe the causes of anti-disciplinary behavior 
in the SDPP, we will present our findings under two sub­
headings. Under the first heading, the causes and effects of 
the struggle among various intra-party factions, which were 
also the supporters of the different ideological formations 
will be analysed. Then, the causes and effects of the 
struggles about the various issues will be our major concern. 
In the discussion of the latter, the Kurdish issue and the 
anti-disciplinary behaviors of the Kurdish clique within the 
SDPP will be emphasized because of its currency and its 
importance both within the party and at the national level.
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STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP: DIVISIONS AND UNITIES IN THE SDPP
In the SDPP the anti-disciplinary behaviours are mainly 
motivated by the intra-party competitions over coming to 
power among the factions within the party. Each clique and 
their members generally have a tendency to violate the party 
unity, when they are in the opposition within the party. 
And this conflict among the intra-party factions is generally 
concretized as a struggle between the Baykal group and the 
others.
Before describing the power struggle within the party
we will briefly describe the intra-party factions of the SDPP.
At the very beginning, the Baykal clique, which is
relatively towards the right within the SDPP, generally
competed with the left wing clique which consisted of some
famous names within the party, such as Aydin Guven Gurkan,
Fikri Sağlar, Ercan Karakas, Kemal Anadol, Abdullah
Bastürk, I. Hakki Onal, Cüneyt Canver and some Kurdish-
originned members of the party (later those members resigned
from the party and established the People's Labor Party.)
In 1988, besides the Inonu group, Baykal clique and
the left-wing, there were some other marginal factions
within the party. For example Ismail Cem group and the
'renewal' group under the leadership of Ertugrul Gunay were
2
the political groups challenging the party administration.
As the leading member of the new-left social democratic 
3
ideology, Ismail Cem tried to secure a base within the 
party organization. But he failed in the second general
27
party congress. In this congress there were three lists by
three fundamental cliques: Inonu, Baykal and the left-wing
lists. In this congress Inonu took 710 votes, whereas the
votes that Ismail Cem took, was only 151. While Inonu was
5
preserving his leadership position, the Baykal group secured
the majority in the party assembly and the other
administrative organs of the party. Deniz Baykal was also
6
elected as the general secretary of the party.
On the other hand, the renewal group of Ertugrul Gunay 
supported various groups involved, in various times, in the 
power struggle within the SDPP. And they chose the way of 
making some revisions and innovations in the social 
democratic ideology of the party in accordance with the 
requirements of the recent global transformations in the 
world.
By the end of 1988, the left-wing faction within the
7party was divided into two, the Kurdish originned members,
8
and the others, and remained in opposition.
After this division, the Kurdish origin party members 
began to emerge as another intra-party faction and as an 
important cause of violation of party discipline. Since we 
will examine the party discipline crisis which was led by 
this clique, in the next session of this chapter, now, we 
will briefly mention about the ideological formation and the 
important members of this faction.
The Kurdish clique within the SDPP generally consisted 
of South-eastern originned deputies and the party members. 
The cultural autonomy, the welfare of the region, the
28
official or unofficial pressures over the Kurdish language
and the people of the region were the main issues of their
political discourse. By the end of the 1988 the leading names
of this clique were Ibrahim Aksoy, Ahmet Turk, Adnan Ekmen,
M. Ali Eren, Kenan Sönmez, I. Hakki Onal, Mahmut Alinak,
Fehmi Isiklar, Salih Sumer, and Arif Sag.
The struggle between these intra-party factions and anti-
disciplinary attitutes continued increasingly and the number
9of dismissals and resignments intensified in 1989.
Dismissals of some of the local party organizations,
which belonged to one clique by the other clique when it was
in power was a usual phenomenon in the SDPP. For example,
in January 12, 1988 the party organization of Icel province
which belonged to the Baykal group, was dismissed by the
10
party's general secretary Fikri Sağlar. The fundamental
reasons for the Sağlar's decision were the active support by
Icel organization for Baykal and their rejection of the
present party administration.
But nearly two months later, after the resignation of
Sağlar from the party and the end of the influence of the
left-wing in the administrative cadres, the party
organization of Adana province, which was under the
domination of the left-wing, was dismissed from their office
by the new party administration, because of the same reasons
11
that were valid in the dismissal of Icel organization.
Upon these developments,the main conflict occurred 
between the dominant Baykal group and the left-wing group in
29
the early months of the year 1989. This period was, more
or less, the beginning of the unavoidable dismissals and the
resignations of the members of the left-wing by virtue of the
pressure of Baykal group and their disharmony with the party 
13
center.
At this point, it is interesting to note that each
dismissed and resigned party member declared his critical
views about the administrative staff of the party in the 
14
press. Those critical speeches appeared as one of the most 
important dimensions of the party discipline issue in the 
SDPP.
Even in the European democracies, writing critical
letters and articles in the press and making critical
speeches outside the parliaments are two of the main
15
breaches of party discipline. Those kinds of breaches were
usual phenomena for the SDPP. For example, on May 24,
1988, the left-wing presented a declaration to the press by
accusing the administrative staff of the central executive,
16
for their factious tendencies.
As response to this declaration, the Baykal group and
the Inonu group presented another declaration by claiming
that the party was suffering from the extreme Marxist and
socialist attitudes of some of the left-wing members.
Afterwards Inonu warned the intra-party factions to stop
17
their extreme behaviours.
Especially the speeches of the left-wing leader, Aydin 
Guven Gurkan, to press, were the main sources of the 
breaches of the party discipline. In his speeches which
12
30
leader allowed Baykal to reshape the SDPP and party
administrative organizations as a center right party. On the
other, Baykal established the domination of only one clique18
in those organizations.
In Spring 1989, due to the increasing oppositional
statements appeared in the press, the party center tried to
use the Central Disciplinary Committee(CDC) as a threat for
the rebellious party members and organizations. Inonu and
Baykal stated that they would not hesitate to use the CDC in
19
order to repress the anti-disciplinary approaches.
The selection of the candidates for the 1989 local
elections by the pre-election method in the SDPP became
another problem between the left-wing members and the party
center. The left-wing members of the party protested the
determination of their candidacy by this method and made a
critical speech to the press, by claiming that the aim of the
new party organization was to eliminate the leftist
candidates by virtue of the pre-election,method in the county
and province party organizations where the Baykal clique
20
members were dominant.
In April 1989, Baykal group decided to change the
party by-law. Their aim was to adopt and reshape the party
by-law in accordance with their initiatives. This caused a
very big reaction of the leftists and some other members of
Inonu group. Later those groups called for an extra-ordinary
21
party congress.
directly accused the party leader, he argued that the party
31
Moreover, 28 of the left-wing deputies while rejecting
Baykal's suggestions over the change of the party by-law,
22
gave an ultimatum to the party leader, Inonu. In this
ultimatum they tried to make Inonu secure the party from the
factious tendencies of Baykal and prevent the adoption of the
new by-law through the initiative of Baykal clique. But they
were not successful in preventing the adoption of the by-law
by Baykal group. On April 10, 1989 despite the opposite
votes of the left-wing party members, the adoption of by-law
23
was approved by the party organization. But the debates on
the new by-law of the party continued as an important24
discipline issue within the party throughout the year. For
example, some of the local party organizations such as Icel-
Tarsus, Kucukcekmece, Sisli, Batman, Sirnak, and Eruh
party organizations were dismissed from the party because of
their opposing attitudes towards the newly made party by- 
25
law.
In May 1989, these developments led the left-wing 
members to force the party center to organize an extra­
ordinary party congress in order to let the delegates discuss
the last by-law adoption and the increasing domination of 
26
Baykal clique.
This demand of the left-wing members was accepted by
the party center, and the SDPP's fourth extra-ordinary party
congress was gathered on June 4, 1989 in order to discuss the
27by-law adoption. In this congress the left-wing members
tried to abolish the new by-law by virtue of the delegates' 
votes. However, the delegates also approved the new by-law
32
initiated by Baykal. This was a reflection of the continuing
support of the party members to the present party
administration. And this was an another victory of Baykal
28clique against the left-wing.
Just after the fourth extra-ordinary congress, the
defeated left-wing divided into various groups. And even
some of the left-wing deputies tried to make their relations
29
better with the Baykal clique, too. But another group of
10 deputies chose the way of resignation from the party by
critisizing the center, on the grounds that the present
initiatives on the whole party organization amounted to
30
violating the party discipline. Other left wing members
decided to preserve their position within the party and
continue their struggle with Baykal clique within the 
31party.
Although general secretary Baykal, just after the
fourth extra-ordinary congress, has secured the future of the
left-wing members within the party, he changed his mind
because of the changing attitudes of those people. Initially
he forced the vice general secretary Cevdet Selvi to resign
32
from his office. Meanwhile Baykal group was trying to make
their domination stronger in the province party organizations
one by one. These developments faced an overwhelming33
opposition from the remaining left-wing.
Even some of the left-wing party members claimed the 
idea that the SDPP transformed into a faction party by the 
domination of Baykal group, and this would, lead the party to
33
members of opposing factions would continue as long as the34
Baykal dominated. Even some of the pro-left-wing province
party organizations adopted those arguments by giving
35
advertisements to the daily newspapers.
As a response, on September 11, 1989, Baykal group
dismissed 7 of the province party organizations, and
replaced them with the pro-Baykal party members. According to
them those kinds of attitudes of the left-wing members were
harmful for the party discipline and giving advertisement to36
the newspapers was a breach of party discipline.
This caused a very big .reaction of the left-wing clique. 
Some of the clique members chose a refractory action by
accusing Baykal and the party center, for their decision,37
and by resigning from their offices. Faced with these 
reactions, on October 1989, Baykal clique became more radical
and continued to dismiss some of the province party
38
organizations, such as Adana and Tokat.
b. EMERGENCE OF THE KURDISH ISSUE 
Until now we have tried to show the reflections of the 
struggle among the intra-party factions in the SDPP. But the 
most important party discipline crisis in the SDPP was the 
dismissals and/or the resignations of the Kurdish originned 
party members from the party.
The first concrete manifestation of this party 
discipline issue took place in January 1989. Mr. Ibrahim 
Aksoy, Malatya deputy, while critisizing the anti-
become smaller than before, and that the resignation of the
34
democratic attitudes in the SDPP, stressed the idea of
cultural autonomy of the Kurdish people in the Strasbourg
joint parliamentary commission meeting of the Eurapean
Council. His speech in Strasbourg was considered as a
serious breach of party discipline by the party center. And
he was sent to the disciplinary committee for dismissal from 
39
the party. On February 7, 1989 the SDPP's CDC decided to
dismiss him temporarily from the party for 2 years. But he,
by protesting the decision of the disciplinary committee,
40
appealed to the administrative court. But this application
did not change the SDPP CDC's decision.
Meanwhile a more serious party discipline issue.erupted
in the SDPP. A group of the Kurdish originned left-wing
deputies joined the Kurdish Congress which was held in Paris
on October 14-15, 1989. Before their departure to Paris
Inonu warned those Kurdish deputies by calling their
attention to the potential reactions of the Turkish public41
for such a kind of action. As a matter of fact,
responsible party organs forbid the joining of the Kurdish
42
deputies to the Paris Kurdish Congress. Although some of
the Kurdish deputies asked for permission for joining to the
Kurdish Congress, their demand was rejected by Inonu
43
himself.
Contrary to the SDPP's prohibition, a group of Kurdish
originned deputies, Ahmet Turk, Adnan Ekmen, M. Ali Eren,
Kenan Sönmez, I. Hakki Onal, Mahmut Alinak and Salih Sumer
went to Paris in order to join the conference which was named44
, "Kurds, human rights and cultural identity." This
35
attitude caused a very big reaction both within the party and 
throughout the country.
Soon after, Inonu immediately called the central
executive committee for a meeting about the last discipline 45
crisis. In the meeting of central executive committee on
October 17, 1989, those Kurdish deputies were sent to the
central disciplinary committee with the reguest of dismissal
46by the majority of the committee members. Inonu was asked,
by the so called left-wing party members, for a pardon of
those Kurdish originned deputies, but he rejected this demand 
47decisively.
However, those seven Kurdish deputies declared that they
were not penitent for their actions and they did not make a
mistake and that the emergence of such a discipline crisis
48
was the sin of the party center. They claimed that the 
party center made a wrong decision by forbiding them to join 
the congress.
Besides those individual declarations, those 7 Kurdish
deputies made a statement to the press on October 18, 1989,
in which they claimed the idea that their action was not
offensive and therefore there was no need to give them any
punishment. However, some of the discipline committee
members, for example, Mehmet Mirza Doğan, stated that,
opposition to the decisions of the party leader was a
disciplinary offense, and that therefore, sending them to
the disciplinary committee was the correct
49decision. However, some of the left-wing clique members such
36
as, Fuat Atalay, Ömer Çiftçi, Mehmet Mogultay, Fikri
Sağlar, Tevfik Koçak, Eşref Erdem, Erdoğan Yetene, Hikmet
Çetin, Abdulkadir Ateş and Mehmet Kahraman stili asked
50
Inonu for a lighter punishment. But this demand was also
rejected by the party leader.
Meanwhile State Security Court (SSC) also began to
investigate into those deputies who went to the Kurdish51
Congress in Paris. Those Kurdish originned deputies, M.
Ali Eren, I. Hakki Onal, Salih Sumer, and Ibrahim Aksoy
critisized the SDPP administration, on the grounds that it
led to the SSC's investigation . They claimed that the party
center unnecessarily increased the tension throughout the.
country and this issue was overemphasized by the Baykal
52
clique especially.
Later, on November 5, seven accused Kurdish deputies
gave their joint plea to the Central Executive Committee
53
(CEC) . In this plea, they claimed that if the party
disciplinary committee would dismiss any of them, this would
damage not only the party unity but also the national
54
unity.
Even some of the Eastern-province party organizations
threatened the party center that voter's support would
decline, if the party disciplinary committee dismissed the55
seven Kurdish deputies from the party. Moreover, those
seven Kurdish deputies also decided to resign from the party
56
as another threat to the party center.
But those kinds of threats and anti-disciplinary 
behaviours were not welcomed by all of the left-wing party
37
members. The left wing divided into two groups, on November
13,1989, as the supporters of the accused deputies and as the 57
neutral ones. Among these groups the-Progressive Patriotic 
Union- of the left-wing clique, which consisted of the 
radical leftist and Kurdish originned deputies was the 
leading one in the violation of the party discipline. They 
demonstrated their reaction by giving speeches to press, by
cross-voting within the party organizations, and by not
58participating in the party's parliamentary group meetings.
On the other hand, some of the other left-wing clique members
such as Vedat Altun, Erdal Kalkan, decided to join the
59
Baykal group.
In the meantime,Inonu stated that,although these
Kurdish originned deputies were valuable members of the
party, in order to establish the discipline within the party
they should be given a punishment. Because they not only
spoiled the rules of the party discipline, but also gave rise
to a national crisis. Therefore giving a disciplinary
punishment to those deputies was closely related to the
60
future of the party in Turkish politics.
Following these events, upon the meeting of the CDC on
61
November 17, 1989, seven Kurdish origin deputies were
dismissed, in accordance with the articles 79/a and 79/c of 
the party by-law. In the statement of reason, it was 
mentioned that those deputies infracted the rules and the 
decisions of the party programme and the by-law, and they 
violated the suggestions that were presented in the party
38
congress.
These temporary dismissals of the Kurdish originned
deputies from the SDPP led to boil up the main conflict
between the Baykal digue and the left-wing. The left wing
members accused the Baykal clique and the CEC of being
undemocratic, unlike social democrats and of creating of
63
fragmentations between the Kurdish and the Turkish people.
Similarly, Ibrahim Aksoy , Malatya deputy , who was
dismissed from the SDPP, compared the decisions of September
12,1980, and the SDPP party disciplinary committees' with
regard to the similarity they showed in their
64
repressiveness.
Ertugrul Gunay , the leader of the 'renewal' clique, on
the other hand, by critisizing the Baykal and Inonu groups,
claimed that the SDPP under the domination of those groups
and cliques, helped to continue the repressive65
depolitization policies of the 1980 military coup.
In response, Inonu argued that those intra-party
struggles negatively affected the image of the party in the
eyes of the people. Therefore he warned the party members
about the rules of the party discipline which were written in
the party by-law. Inonu also claimed that the CDC had taken
66
the decision freely and it was right. And this decision of
the CDC was not directed to the Kurdish people and the
Kurdish issue. It was only a matter of intra-party 
67
discipline.
The dismissals case led to some other crises too. For 
example, on November 22, 1989, seventeen deputies decided to
62
39
resign from the party, because of their distress within the
party. Although their decision of resignation did not
directly relate to the dismissal of the seven deputies, it
68played some role in this decision.
Soon, party organization of the 12 eastern provinces
69resigned from the party in order to protest the dismissals.
Besides, four deputies, Abdullah Basturk, Istanbul deputy,
Fehmi Isiklar, Bursa deputy, Cüneyt Canver, Adana deputy and
Ilhami Binici, Bingöl deputy, resigned from the party by
critisizing the party administration, for its anti-
70
democratic decisions.
Towards the end of November, the debate about the 
dismissals crisis slowed down. But the struggle among the
cliques, through critical declarations made about each other,
71
continued throughout the year.
From another point of view, the left-wing leader, A. 
Guven Gurkan, stated that the reason of the intra-party 
divisions was the anti-democratic and the illegal attitudes 
of Inonu and Baykal cliques. This attitude of the party 
administration broke the dialogue within the party and this
caused the intra-party polarization which led to the
72
violation of party discipline.
Moreover, the chairman of the Istanbul province party 
organization, Ercan Karakas, claimed that the SDPP under the 
administration of Baykal and Inonu groups, weakened the
confidence of the voters which would be the end of the
73
Party.
40
Furthermore Kemal Anadol, Izmir deputy, argued that the
present party discipline problem was as a consequence of the
move of the Party from a social democratic stand to a
rightist one. Therefore, according to him, those problems
were not only related with the Kurdish problem but with the
74
ideological transformations in the SDPP.
The struggle among the intra-party cliques continued
also on the other platforms. For example, in the SDPP Adana
meeting, on December 4, 1989, some party members hooted
Inonu,and Baykal, and then those members were sent to the
provincial disciplinary committees for dismissal. And finally
75they were dismissed at the end.of December.
In order to prevent those violations of discipline,
resignations, and dismissals, Inonu decided to use the
authority of the CEC all over the party organizations. His
aim was to achieve and maintain a cohesive party
organization. He claimed that the discipline problems within
the party would only be solved by using the legitimate
authority of the CEC. For this reason he called for the
76support of the pro-center party members.
Soon, some party organizations reflected their
confidence and support towards the party center. For example,
Istanbul and Ankara metropolitan mayors and some members of
the county party organizations declared their loyalty to
77Inonu and the present party administration. Similarly, pro­
center party members were attacking the extreme- leftists in 
the SDPP. For example, Eskişehir Mayor Selami Vardar 
critisized the existence of the extreme leftist party members
41
within the SDPP. Upon this, the left-wing members asked for
an interim party congress in order to discuss these kinds of
ideological divisions within the party. They claimed that the
present problem of the SDPP could be solved only by the
discussions of the party members in a civilized and
78
democratic platform.
Inonu did not reject this demand of the leftists, and in
this atmosphere, the SDPP fifth interim Party Congress was
assembled. In this interim congress, the left-wing clique
made a declaration about calling for an extra-ordinary party
congress. Their aim was to replace the present party
administration with their own group members. Or, at least
they aimed to show their opposition to Baykal and to his
79
factious administration.
In the congress, however, the main discussion theme
between the opposing factions was again the dismissals of the
seven Kurdish deputies and the Kurdish issue in general. On
this issue Inonu claimed that this crisis was very much
against the party interests and weakened its public image
80
and party cohision, causing many discipline violations.
At the end of this fifth interim congress, Baykal
group strengthened its domination in the central
administration. This was very much critisized by the left-
81
wing clique which expressed its distress in various ways.
For example, the leader of the left-wing clique A. Guven
82
Gurkan resigned from the party, on December 12, 1989. He
also said that Baykal did not want to maintain a social
42
democratic party. Aydin Guven Gurkan was one of the
founders and the first leader of the SDPP. Therefore his
resignation created a very big echo within the party and
84
especially in the left-wing clique.
Upon these continious heavy criticisms and
resignations, Baykal argued that after all the SDPP became
more limpid and clear since the dismissed members made some
mistakes. By dismissing them, the party would become bigger
85and stronger and come to power.
2. A NEW VERSION OF THE COMPETITION FOR LEADERSHIP 
While the conflictual relation between the intra-party 
factions were negatively affecting the performance and the 
harmony of the Baykal-Inonu alliance, the increasing power of 
Baykal clique within the party began to threaten Inonu's 
leadership. Moreover the factious tendencies of Baykal 
relatively provoked intra-party oppositions and created new 
discipline and administrative crisis. In order to solve these 
problems and to get the support of the intra-party forces 
Inonu decided to consider the general tendencies within the 
party. At the same time, he considered establishing an 
alliance with the left-wing, as an alternative to the Baykal 
clique. He stated that when he could get the support of 
those cliques, he would change the present administrative
cadre at that moment. This was a signal for the end of the
86domination of Baykal group within the party administration.
This was also the beginning of the continuing power 
struggle between Baykal and Inonu. And finally, to settle
83
43
accounts with each other, they decided to make a general
87party congress towards the end of January 1990.
At the beginning of 1990, one opposing faction, the
'social democrats for renewal' did not choose the way of
resigning from the party. The leader of this group, Ertugrul
Gunay, said that they would try to explain their views in the
party caucus and look forward for the support of the party 
88
members.
Similarly another opposition leader , Ismail Gem,
supporting the reneval group, mentioned that their aim was to89
unite the party and abolish the factions and oppositions.
In the by-law congress, in January 30, 1990, Inonu was
reelected as the leader. Also Baykal group gained 39 seats
out of 44 in the party assembly. The other 5 seats were
shared by the other two cliques. These cliques' members were
Ertugrul Gunay and Ismail Gem, from the innovationist group,
and Ahmet Isvan, Seyfi Oktay, and Gevdet Selvi from the 
90
left-wing.
The results of the congress were protested by various.
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left-wing party members. Besides, party assembly member.
Ismail Gem, claimed that the division of the party into
three main cliques was the main obstacle for the SDPP to come 
92
to power.
Reestablishment of the Baykal domination over the party 
after the by-law congress discomposed the party leader.
After that Inonu decided to assume an attitude towards 
Baykal's domination. And he threatened that if Baykal group 
did not obey the party by-law he would resign from the party
44
leadership.
After the regulation congress the struggle between the
Baykal group and the innovationist clique increased steadily.
94In various province congresses they opposed each other.
Meanwhile the resignations and dismissals from the party 
continued unceasingly. For example, Arslan Baser Kafaoglu 
resigned from the party claiming that the party center acted
in accordance with the wishes of the dominant external powers
95which tried to steer the party ideology towards right.
Moreover Inonu, in his trips to the south-eastern
provinces, was hooted by the party members of those province
party organizations, because of the party administration's96
kurdish policy. Upon these developments, he declared that
if the seven dismissed deputies gave guarantees to obey the
party rules and regulations concerning the party discipline,
97they could be able to return to the Party. But, the seven
dismissed deputies rejected this invitation of Inonu.
According to them their dismissals was the mistake of the
98
SDPP and they could do nothing any more.
In this atmosphere the SDPP participated in the 26 March 
1989 elections. In this election the party was unsuccessful 
and it lost the support of the voters relatively. In this 
failure the lack of the party discipline within the SDPP was 
very influential. Intra-party power struggle between the 
Baykal and the Inonu groups which was very much emphasized 
by the press, and the disunity within the party destroyed 
the image of the party among the voters. Before the elections
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other parties also continiously emphasized this problematic
of the SDPP. It lost the image of being an alternative party
to come to power. The election results amounted to a warning99
for the party to put its house in order.
The March 26 1990 election results were also critisized 
by the intra-party opposition members. For example, Cevdet 
Selvi, Fikri Sağlar, and Ertugrul Gunay stated that the the 
party administration was responsible for this failure. And
the result was a warning of the voters for the party
100
center. Moreover, some of the opposing party members
wanted Baykal to resign from the office of the secretary
general by claiming that his cadre and faction was harmful
101
for the future of the party.
Upon these critical developments, the Baykal clique and
102
finally Baykal decided to leave the party administration.
Baykal and his friends who were in the execution
committee of the party submitted their resignations to Inonu.
Then the leadership struggle between Baykal and Inonu103
started publicly. In this struggle the left-wing and
innovationist party members began to support Inonu against 
104
Baykal.
Meanwhile, a merciless competition was fired between
Inonu and Baykal by virtue of the press. For example, while
Inonu accused Baykal of being irresponsible, Baykal105
critisized Inonu for his effort to fight a duel with him.
In another speech to the press Inonu said that they would106
not leave the party administration to the Baykal faction.
Later on, the sides of the leadership race became
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clearer. The innovâtionists supported Inonu, whereas 41
chairmen of the provincial party organizations espoused
107Baykal as their candidate for leadership. Meanwhile
108Ismail Cem began to support the leadership of Baykal, but
he met with the opposition of some party members, among them
Ercan Karakas, Ertugrul Gunay, Onur Kumbaracibasi. Moreover
some important names within the party such as Ali Topuz and
109Aytekin Kotil also supported Baykal.
While the metropolitan mayors were in support of Inonu,
the majority of the county mayors within those provinces
110generally supported Baykal.
Both sides determined their candidate cadres before the
party congress. For example Inonu's candidates for the
general secretary were Fikri Sağlar, Hikmet Çetin, and Onur
Kumbaracibasi. On the other hand Baykal's candidates were
111Ismail Cem and Cumhur Keskin.
Additionally some of the resigned party members, for
example Aydin Guven Gurkan also joined the debate between
Baykal and Inonu. According to Gurkan the SDPP would show
112
its prudence towards a minority faction.
Upon the general failure in the local elections, Mr.
Vahit Calin, candidate for Bayrampaşa mayor, was dismissed
113
because the DLP candidate won the election.
And finally, the Party congress was convened on September 
29, 1990. At the end of this general party congress Inonu
was reelected as the leader of the SDPP by taking the votes 
of 504 delegate, while Baykal took 405 of them. Meanwhile
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both Inonu and Baykal accused each other of being responsible
114
for the dismissal decision.
Some pro-Baykal party members, such as Fuat Atalay,
Guler Tanyolac, Onder Kirli, Tayfur Un opposed the results115of the party congress.
In response to these critiques, Inonu mentioned that the
116results of the congress show a positive sign. In the
Party assembly 40 seats out of 44 were elected from Inonu's
list and only 4 members from the Baykal list. In the
meantime the ex-left-wing leader A. Guven Gurkan, began to
117support the new party administration.
On the other hand, new administration of the party
decided to proclaim a pardon for the dismissed and resigned
party members, especially the seven Kurdish origin 118
deputies.
However, new dismissal cases occurred spontaneously. For
example Adana province, and Seyhan and Tarsus county party
organizations dismissed from the party by the central
disciplinary committee because of their irregularity in their
119
disposal in the membership issues. Many other pro-Baykal
province and county party organizations were also dismissed
from the party by the new administration. This caused a
120
strong reaction of Baykal clique.
Those dismissals created other kinds of disciplinary 
problems. For example, a group of Adana-Seyhan county 
organization members beat the central executive committee 
member Hasan Zengin who was assigned to investigate the 
irregularities in the Seyhan party organization. Those party
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members were sent to the disciplinary committee for 
121
dismissal. Similarly Istanbul province disciplinary
committee dismissed Kucukcekmece, and Gaziosmanpaşa mayors
and many other party members because of their
122
irregularities. Meanwhile the Baykal group called
123themselves with the name of "New-left”.
3. NEW SEPARATIONS AND UNITIES
The year 1991 also witnessed struggles between Baykal
and Inonu. And, of course, the breaches of discipline were
the usual phenomenon in this period, too.
The second round of the conflict between Baykal and
Inonu emerged on July 27-28, 1991 ( Third General Party
Congress). Before the third party congress, there were two
general centers in the SDPP. The first one was the party
general center, the second the Baykal's general center. This
124
caused a division of the party into two main camps.
In the third party congress, the struggle was very
hard between Baykal and Inonu. Finally Inonu was reelected
as the leader of the party by taking the 534 votes out of 985
125
delegates, while Baykal took the 451 of the votes. This
result was the proof of dividedness of the SDPP into two
strictly defined different camps. And it also showed that
although Baykal failed for the second time in the leadership
race, he attracted the support of nearly half of the party 126
delegations. This support made Baykal continue his
leadership struggle within the Party. And he began to wait 
for a more appropriate time in order to come to power within
49
the party.
The year 1991 was also the year of early general
elections. Before the October 20, 1991 general elections,
the SDPP, under the leadership of Inonu, established an
alliance with the pro-Kurdish People's Labour Party (HEP).
The PLP was not allowed- to participate in the general
elections by the Higher Council of Election due to fact that
128it did not complete its nation wide party organization.
The SDPP deputy candidates in eastern provinces were
129generally from the PLP.
This attitudes of Inonu attracted the reactions of the 
Baykal clique members within the Party. And outside the
Party there were also the critical, arguments of various 
paradigms about the PLP and the SDPP alliance for the 
elections. This propaganda had an affect over the SDPP
voters, especially in the western provinces of the country, 
excluding only Antalya province. And in the elections the 
SDPP failed especially in those provinces and it became the 
third party while it was the second biggest party of the 
country in the previous elections. Just after the general 
elections. Baykal critised the present administration because 
of their permission to let the PLP originned candidates to 
participate in the election in the SDPP lists. The PLP, 
performing as a Kurdish nationalist party by rejecting some 
of the fundamental principles of the state ideology in a 
radical manner in.Turkey, attracted the reactions of the non- 
Kurdish masses who were loyal to their state and to its
127
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ideology. Consequently the PLP originned SDPP candidates,
especially in the eastern provinces, won the elections. But
the Turkish social democratic voters in the west reflected
their reactions to this alliance by supporting the other
parties in the general elections. But since the SDPP was
relatively more successful in the eastern provinces, a
considerable number of the SDPP deputies who were elected in
the last general elections, were the Kurdish originned PLP
members. Approximately 22 PLP originned deputies entered into
130the parliament as a consequence of this alliance.
Of course, it was not only the alliance with the PLP but
many other fundamental factors which were responsible for
this failure. For example, the division of the party among
the factions, and the struggle among them was again a
problematic for the party. Some argued that those divisions
even negatively influenced the well functioning of the party
organizations in the election regions. The struggles among
the cliques was so dramatic that party members in some of the
provinces either refused to campaign for the party or made a
negative propaganda of the party, because of their hostility
to the party center which was under the domination of the
opposite faction. The failure of the SDPP in the131
municipalities of the metropolitan areas was also a 
negative factor for the SDPP before the elections. The voters 
in those areas tended to support the center right parties of 
the political spectrum. Finally the SDPP participated in the 
last general elections without achieving some innovations in 
the party programme and ideology. The party was still
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supporting the old-fashioned social democratic policies which
were structured by a strong etatist tendencies. More liberal
solutions to the economic problems were on the rise
throughout the world and the Turkish society could not be
excluded from those tendencies. Socio-economic transformation
of the Turkish society, which had begun after 1980, very much
affected the world views and philosophy of life of the
Turkish voters. In this context the etatist policies of the
132SDPP were no longer attractive for the Turkish citizens.
The separationist policies of those PLP originned
deputies created probably the most important party discipline
crisis in the SDPP history. In the ceremony of taking an
oath in the first meeting of the new parliament just after
the last elections, those deputies, especially Leyla Zana
and Hatip Dicle, created a very serious discipline problem
by making the propaganda of a Kurdish terrorist network
(PKK). This attitude of those deputies caused a national
reaction in the Turkish public opinion, too. And the
reaction of the leader Inonu was also very hard. Just after
the behaviours of Zana and Dicle, he decided to call for the
133
dismissal of those deputies from the party.
But this did not stop the reactions to the PLP originned
deputies, within and outside the party. Both the anti-
disciplinary behaviours of those Kurdish deputies and the
reactions towards them continued until the establishment of
134the coalition government.
Furthermore, both the failure of the Party in the last
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general elections under the leadership of Inonu, and the 
problem that was created by the Kurdish originned PLP 
deputies caused increasing criticisms towards the Inonu 
leadership especially by the Baykal clique.
They claimed that in the failure of the Party in the 
last general elections, the responsibility belonged to 
Inonu's leadership. He destroyed the image of the party by
establishing an alliance with the PLP members, and his
135passive administration was another factor in this failure.
These criticisms increased the degree of the struggle
between Baykal and Inonu groups. Baykal's group declared
their desire for calling an extra-ordinary party congress,
in order to renew the administrative staff and to resolve the
136present problems within the party.
Finally Inonu decided to call for an extra-ordinary
congress which would be the first congress after the last
general elections. And it would be the nineth party congress137
throughout the five-years-old SDPP history.
Before the party congress, the SDPP established a
coalition government with the True Path Party (DYP). This
coalition was an opportunity for Inonu to maintain his
leadership, since it gave the party the advantage of being in
138
power under the leadership of Inonu. The leader, in turn
claimed the idea that a change in the Party administrative
staff would cause the abolition of the coalition government.
And he indirectly threatened the party delegations by such a 
139
danger.
In the Party congress the main subject was te failure of
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the SDPP in the general elections. Both sides critisized
140each other for being responsible for this fact.
At this time, the innovationist clique, under the
leadership of Ertugrul Gunay, decided to support the Inonu
group as against the factitious approaches of the Baykal 141
clique.
In the Congress, Inonu was reelected as the Party
leader by taking the 516 votes, against the 486 votes of
142Baykal, from the party delegations.
After losing the party congress, Baykal remained in 
opposition. But the 486 votes from the Party delegations was 
the highest score that Baykal took in the leadership race
within the party. This shows that Baykal clique has an
143
ossified potential within the Party.
In the last nine months of the coalition period, it can
be seen that the SDPP relatively solved the party discipline
problems within and outside the party. This was facilitated
by the resignation of the majority of the Kurdish originned
PLP deputies from the Party, by critisizing the attitudes
of both the SDPP and the new coalition government towards the
Kurdish people and the Kurdish problem. Only a few members
of this clique remained within the party , most notably ,
Fehmi Isiklar. But since they have got some duties within
the Party and in the parliament, they became too marginal
144
and passive to violate the Party discipline.
On the other hand, the Baykal clique turned back to its 
opposing position. And they again began to wait for a more
54
appropriate situation for the leadership struggle.
In the meantime the innovationists supported the Inonu 
administration because they shared some of the administrative 
positions with the Inonu group.
All the opposing cliques and groups were deactivated 
within the coalition government process. But the most 
important factor in this passivization was some interest 
expectations of those groups from the coalition government. 
They tried to share some of the favours of being in power.
Therefore, this relative decline in the volume and the 
quality of the party discipline problems seems to be just a 
temporary situation.
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CHAPTER III
A GENERAL EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
In the light of the content analysis of the party 
discipline cases in the SDPP as appeared in Turkish daily 
press between 1988-1992 (until spring), we can classify main 
sources of violations of party discipline as follows:
(a) The leadership struggle;
(b) The ideological/factional differentiation;
(c) The Kurdish problem.
In the following paragraphs, we will evaluate the 
findings concerning these general categories of the party 
discipline violations.
1. THE LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE AND THE IDEOLOGICAL FACTIONAL
DIFFERENTIATION
It can be said that the existence of factional 
differentiation in the party is generally motivated by power 
struggle among the candidates of the leadership position. It 
can also be argued that the ideological distinctions within 
the party are generally the consequence of the weak party 
ideology. Ideological differentiation, therefore, becomes a 
cover for the power struggle.
As a very striking interpretation concerning the 
discipline violations, Cezmi Kartay, the chairman of the 
SDPP's public administration and executive committee, stated 
that the party discipline problem within the SDPP was related 
with the fact that the party has not come to power for many
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years. In other words, according to Kartay, what causes
breaches in the party unity is not the ideological divisions,
but the desire to control the party organization. So, he
claimed that the discipline problems within the SDPP were not
directly related with the party ideology but with the intra-
1party struggle to come to power.
Similarly, faced with the discipline problems and the
resignations within the SDPP, Inonu argued that these were
not the results of the ideological differentiations within
the SDPP, rather, they were meaningless developments
2harmful for the interest of the party.
Therefore it may be stated that this factional 
differentiation usually manifests itself as the leadership 
struggle within the party. With this reasoning, one
supporting idea appeared in the press:
"Inonu may be said to represent a synthesis between the 
views existing within the party, from the pro-Kurdish to the 
nationalists, from the neo-socialist to the outspokenly free 
market advocates and to the xenophobic and views more 
typically associated with President Ozal. Baykal, for his 
part, as head of the self-styled "New-Left" movement, adopts 
more openly the stance that it is time to bury anything 
smacking of traditional left-wing idealism and act
pragmatically. But there is lack of clarity as to who 
represents what, and in practice on what specific issues. The 
struggle for the control of the party has over-shadowed the 
urgent need recognised by all observers for the party to
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reach a consensus on its own identity.”
This also shows us that lack of ideological clarity
in the SDPP has been an important factor in anti-disciplinary
behaviour within the party.
As another interesting approach to the intra-party
factions within the SDPP A. Guven Gurkan has suggested in
one of his speeches to the press that the intra-party
struggle among the cliques helped Inonu since he used each
clique towards the others to serve his interests within the 4
party. This argument reinforces the view that the divisions
among the factions within the party was motivated by
interest struggle rather than ideological distinctions.
Meanwhile a report, published in Gunes daily claimed
that those factions in the SDPP were inherited from the RPP
as the most important pathological feature of the Turkish
social democracy since the period of transition to democracy.
These interest struggles were also present in the RPP among
different groups in order to gain power within the party. The
struggles between ismet Inonu and Bülent Ecevit, and then
between Ecevit and Deniz Baykal can be given as examples of
the intra-party power struggles, which took the shape of
5
ideological distinctions in the RPP.
In concluding this section on the intra-party conflict 
and violation of party discipline cases, the arguments made 
by the above sources support our primary propositions 
concerning the reasons of anti-disciplinary behavior in the 
SDPP.
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On the other hand, if we try to analyze the 
consequences of those anti-disciplinary behaviours in the 
SDPP we can arrive at the following conclusions: firstly,
there were the problems of dismissals of the some party 
members because of their anti-disciplinary behaviours and 
irregularities. Secondly, the resignations from the party as 
a result of factional struggles became the usual phenomena. 
Thirdly, the continuous power struggle between Inonu and 
Baykal existed throughout the period affecting the well­
functioning of the party. And finally, the distortion of the 
party image in the eyes of the voters appeared as the main
consequence of all those negative aspects of the party..This-
last point appears to be the most problematic dimension of 
the party discipline problem in the SDPP since it can be 
regarded as the main factor responsible for the failure of 
the SDPP in the last October 20, 1991 general elections.
This issue was very much emphasized by various 
intellectuals, journalists, politicians, and writers on the 
social democratic ideology, just after the failure of the 
SDPP in the last general elections. For example, Altan Oymen, 
in one of his articles in Milliyet daily categorized the 
weak aspects of the party under four headings: (a) the
universal decline of socialist and social democratic 
ideologies; (b) the failure of the SDPP originned 
municipalities in some of the major provinces of the country; 
(c) the reaction of the voters to the PLP and the SDPP 
alliance; (d) the intra-party disunity problem.
Oymen stated that, this last point created a chaotic
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vision about the SDPP in the minds of the voters. The 
continuous struggle among many groups and persons -Baykal, 
Inonu, Gunay, Sozen, persons from South-Eastern Anatolia, 
persons from Middle Anatolia- caused a disharmony and
disunity within the party. Therefore, it is obvious that such 
a disunited and chaotic political party could not give the 
image of being a good alternative to the government 
administration.
Other arguments raised about this issue were also
similar to that of Altan Oymen. If we make a brief summary of
those views, we can state that, although there were other
factors in this failure such as " the failings of the SDPP-
controlled local authorities, the influence of the media, the
international end-of-ideology atmosphere, poor publicity,
6
lack of dynamic leadership, over confidence" , "the
approach adopted towards the Democratic Left party of Bülent
' 7Ecevit, the nature of the election propaganda" , the anti- 
disciplinary behaviours were the most influential factor in 
the distortion of the party image in the eyes of the voters 
and then in the failure of the party in the general 
elections. Of course, it is obvious that this argument does 
not depend on a scientific research, however, the debate in 
the media about the failure of the SDPP, in this period, was 
focused generally on the above argument.
On the other hand, when we look at the main actors 
involved in the breaches of the party discipline in _he 
SDPP, they were generally the active members of various
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opposing factions. The persons who played a role in the 
development of the ideology of their own cliques violated the 
party discipline regulations by making critical speeches 
towards the party administration or other cliques. For 
example, Aydin Guven Gurkan within the 'left-wing', Ertugrul 
Gunay within the 'renewal social democrats', Ismail Cem 
within the 'new-left' factions can be considered in this 
category.
2. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE KURDISH ORIGINNED MPs
Like the issues of 'leadership struggle' and the
'factional differentiation', the Kurdish issue is also
motivated by the loose ideological base and the loose
structure of the party organization.
"The Kurdish originned MPs were one-time members of
the People's Labour Party (HEP)- itself a splinter from the
SDPP- and owed their parliamentary seats representing
Southestern constituencies partly to the electoral alliance
8
between HEP and the SDPP at last years elections."
This Kurdish clique was not oriented towards power 
struggle that was aimed at capturing the party administration 
and which was created by the power gap in the administrative 
authority of the party. This clique, however, is an ethnic 
oriented faction rather than a power oriented one.
Moreover its ideological formation also did not 
develop as a cover for its leadership struggle as it was the 
case in other cliques of the party. Their ethnic oriented 
ideological formation developed as a completely different
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paradigm from the ideological formations of the other present 
cliques within the SDPP. Therefore, the most serious party 
discipline violations came from this clique as a result of 
its ideological misformation distinct from the other 
components of the party.
3. CONCLUSION:
In order to identify the modes of anti-disciplinary 
behaviours that were commonly committed by the members of 
various opposing factions within the SDPP, let's firstly look 
at the Edward Crowe's list of the seven breaches of 
discipline. According to this list the types of discipline 
violations can be presented as follows;
-Privately expressing dissent to whips;
-Making a critical speech in Parliament;
-Cross-voting;
-Abstaining;
-Signing critical letters and articles in the press;
9
-Making critical speeches outside the parliament.
From the perspective of Crowe's analysis, in the 
SDPP, however, the modes of the anti-disciplinary behaviour 
can be listed in terms of their frequency within the party 
as follows;
(a) Making critical speechs outside the parliament;
(b) Writing critical letters and articles in the press;
(c) Privately expressing dissent to whips.
Since it is the unclear party ideology which creates 
an ideological gap,the members of the various cliques can
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easily support different approaches within the same party. 
And this prevents the production of a coherent and effective 
party organization in which all party members share the same 
general view.
However, we can not explain this disunitedness 
within the party as a consequence of intra-party democracy 
in the SDPP, because, as we have noted in the earlier 
chapters of this study, in the theoretical sense, the 
existence of intra-party democracy and/or opposition in a 
political organization does not necessarily rule out the 
presence of intra-party unity, intra-party cohesion, and 
intra-party discipline. In a mass party, it is expected that 
various paradigms, even extreme world views must establish 
a consensus among themselves, towards the general politics of 
the party.
In a mass party like the SDPP, those kinds of 
anti-disciplinary behaviours, therefore, can not be, explained 
by the existence of the intra-party democracy in this 
political organization.
On the other hand, if all the different paradigms 
try to make dominant their own extreme views in the party, 
as it was the case in the SDPP, the anti-disciplinary 
behaviours and the chaotic conditions are inevitable.
As a final statement it can be claimed that the 
party discipline is the most important problem for the past, 
the present, and the future of the SDPP.
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